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 All lawyers are enriched when qualified applicants join the ranks of the Utah State 
Bar.  The Petition furthers that goal by permitting otherwise qualified individuals who are 
beneficiaries of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to gain admission to the 
Utah State Bar and practice law in this state.  DACA permits certain immigrants who 
were brought to the United States as children but who do not have lawful status to remain 
in this country without threat of removal action and to obtain work authorization.  As a 
collection of lawyers and fellow members of the bar, we believe qualified DACA 
recipients should be permitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. 
 Section 1621 of Title 8 of the United States Code is not a bar to such action by the 
Court.  While that statute prohibits “public benefits” from being accorded to DACA 
recipients unless the state affirmatively “enact[s]” a “law” to the contrary, a Utah state 
bar license is not a public benefit, and even if it were, this Court could enact a rule 
extending licensure.  A restrictive interpretation of the statute would infringe 
impermissibly on state sovereignty and state equality in violation of the United States 
Constitution.  As a result, the Petition should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
 Pursuant to the Utah Constitution, this Court has the exclusive authority to 
regulate the practice of law in the state, including admission to practice.  Utah Const. art 
VIII, § 4; In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 5, 52 P.3d 1246; Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes 
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& Hayden, 905 P.2d 867 (Utah 1995); see also Michael D. Zimmerman, It Is Time to 
Burn the Boats: “Twin Crises in the Law” Keynote Address, 2014 UTLRON 97, 107 
(“Given the breadth and exclusivity of this power, the Utah Supreme Court is the only 
entity in the state that has the comprehensive capacity to determine what training is 
required to be admitted to practice, what constitutes the practice of law, and what other 
requirements there are for the practice.”).   
This Court has found that “governing the admission to the practice of law” is a 
“compelling state interest” best served through assistance from the Utah State Bar.  Utah 
R. Governing Utah State Bar 14-102(a)(2).  The Utah State Bar supports allowing 
inclined, competent, qualified candidates to engage in the practice of law, including 
DACA recipients who otherwise meet the qualifications for admittance established by 
this Court.  See Second Amended Petition to Allow Bar Admission for Undocumented 
Immigrants, In re: Utah State Bar, No. 20160318-SC (July 5, 2016); History and 
Purpose, Utah State Bar, http://www.utahbar.org/about/utah-bar-history-and-purpose/ 
(last visited February 26, 2019).  We share this position, as our profession and 
community are enhanced when candidates who meet the qualifications for admission are 
permitted to work in the jobs for which they have trained and been educated, rather than 
seeking other professions or moving to other states. 
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For these reasons, we support the Petition.  As set forth below, the Court has the 
authority to do so and thereby extend admission to practice law to DACA recipients who 
otherwise meet the necessary qualifications.  
I. SECTION 1621 DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMISSION TO UTAH’S 
STATE BAR.  
 
Federal law provides that, with a few exceptions not relevant to DACA recipients, 
undocumented immigrants are “not eligible for any State or local public benefit.”   
8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).  A “state or local public benefit” is defined, in relevant part, as “any . 
. . professional license . . . provided by an agency of a State or local government or by 
appropriated funds of a State or local government.”  Id. at 1621(c)(1).  But the 
professional licenses granted to authorize attorneys to practice law in this state are not 
provided by an agency—but by this Court—nor sustained by appropriated funds—but by 
licensure dues and application fees.  Accordingly, section 1621 has no bearing on 
admission to the Utah State Bar. 
First, a license to practice law in Utah is not a “professional license . . . provided 
by an agency of a State or local government” because the Utah Supreme Court, which 
issues the license in connection with the Utah State Bar, is not an “agency of a State or 
local government.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(A).  The federal Administrative Procedures Act 
and its Utah state law equivalent both expressly exclude courts from the definition of 
“agency.”  See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (defining “agency” as “each authority of the Government 
of the United States,” but excluding “Congress” and “the courts of the United States,” 
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etc.); see also Utah Code § 63G-4-103(1)(b) (defining “agency” as “a board, commission, 
department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative 
unit of this state . . . but does not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any 
political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of 
the state.”) (emphasis added).  This understanding of the term agency is also reflected in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines the related term “federal agency” as “[a] 
department or other instrumentality of the executive branch of the federal  
government . . . .”  Black’s Law Dictionary 75 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  Black’s 
continues by noting that “[t]he Administrative Procedure Act defines the term agency 
negatively as being any U.S. governmental authority that does not include Congress, the 
courts, [etc.]” and that “[o]ther federal statutes define agency to include any executive 
department, . . . or other establishment in the executive branch . . . .”  Id. 
Additional evidence for this executive-branch usage of the term “agency” can be 
found in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (“COCA”).  The COCA is the 
“largest freely-available corpus of English, and the only large and balanced corpus of 
American English.  COCA is probably the most widely-used corpus of English . . . .”1  It 
is an empirical sample of the way American English has actually been used from the 
                                                          
1 See https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last visited February 15, 2019).  The COCA “contains 
more than 560 million words of text (20 million words each year 1990-2017) and it is 
equally divided among spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic 
texts.”  Id. 
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1990s to today.  Because section 1621 was first enacted in 1996, the COCA can provide 
evidence of the way in which the term “agency” was used during the relevant time 
period. 
Evidence from the COCA demonstrates that “agency” very commonly appears in 
contexts that are associated with the executive branch of government, and that “agency” 
does not appear to be used with reference to the judicial branch or the bar.  The word 
“agency” commonly appears in close proximity to words relating to the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency—all executive branch agencies.  Tellingly, 
none of the top 200 words that most frequently co-occur with “agency” makes any 
reference to courts, judges, or the bar.2 
Furthermore, in a related context, this Court has held that the Utah State Bar is not 
a “state agency.”  From its founding in 1931, the Utah Supreme Court has “regulated the 
practice of law through its inherent judicial power, in addition to the statutory authority 
conferred on it” prior to 1985.  Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 804 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 
1991).  In 1985, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution was amended to expand the power 
                                                          
2 These results can be viewed at the following link: 
https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/?c=coca&q=73188125 (last visited February 15, 2019).  This 
search shows the words that are statistically most likely to appear in the same 
environment as the word “agency.”  This phenomenon is known as “collocation.”  See 
Susan Hunston, Corpora in Applied Linguistics 68 (2002); see also John R. Firth, A 
Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955, in Studies in Linguistic Analysis 1, 14 (1957) 
(“Collocations are actual words in habitual company.”). 
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of the Court and make explicit its power to regulate the “practice of law.”  Id.  The 
current version of Article VIII, section 4 states: “[t]he supreme court by rule shall govern 
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law.”  Id. (quoting Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4).  Because the 
Utah State Bar is a private, nongovernmental organization that assists this Court in its 
inherent constitutional power to regulate the practice of law, “it is not a ‘state agency.’”  
Id. at 530 (holding the Bar was not required to disclose detailed salary and benefit 
information under public records and freedom of information laws).  
Second, the system that administers law licenses is supported through member 
dues and fees, not “through appropriated funds of a State or local government.”  8 U.S.C. 
1621(c)(1)(A).  While the budget set by the Utah State Legislature designates money for 
various state-licensure programs, including to the Cosmetologist/Barber, Esthetician, 
Electrologist Fund, the Physicians Education Fund, and the Real Estate Education, 
Research, and Recovery Fund, no money is set aside for the legal profession.3  Instead, 
the Utah State Bar is independently funded through revenues generated from a variety of 
sources, notably from licensing fees, admissions fees, continuing legal education, and 
                                                          
3 See Budget of the State of Utah and Related Appropriations 2018–2019, OFFICE OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST, available at 
https://le.utah.gov/interim/2018/pdf/00002208.pdf (last accessed February 26, 2019).  
Monies are designated to specifically fund the courts, the Attorney General’s office, and 
the Guardian ad Litem’s Office. 
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conventions.4  Even though the regulation of the practice of law is administered by the 
Supreme Court, the financial support for membership admission is funded through the 
Utah State Bar licensing and admission fees.  As a result, the mere fact that this Court (as 
opposed to the Bar) is generally supported by appropriated funds is not a sufficient nexus 
to conclude that bar licensure is supported by those funds. 
 Thus, because neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah State Bar is a state 
agency, a license to practice law in the State of Utah is not a “professional license . . . 
provided by an agency of a State or local government.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1).  And 
because attorney admissions are administered by the Utah State Bar, which is self-
funded, licenses are not provided “by appropriated funds of a State or local government.”  
Id.  Accordingly, section 1621 does not prohibit this Court from allowing qualified 
applicants who are DACA recipients to practice law in this state. 
II. EVEN IF SECTION 1621 DID APPLY TO UTAH LAW LICENSES, 
THIS COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND BAR MEMBERSHIP 
BY ENACTMENT OF LAW. 
 
Even if this Court were a public agency, and even if bar licenses were supported 
by appropriated funds, this Court would still have the power to promulgate rules allowing 
undocumented immigrants who otherwise meet the Utah standards for admission to 
become members of the bar.  Section 1621(d) makes clear that even where a license is a 
                                                          
4 Utah State Bar Final Budget FY 2018/19, UTAH STATE BAR (May 11, 2018), 
available at http://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-19-Budget-
FINAL-website.pdf (last accessed February 26, 2019). 
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public benefit awarded by a state agency or supported by appropriated funds, states may 
make undocumented immigrants eligible for that benefit through “the enactment of a 
State law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (“A state may provide that an alien who is not lawfully 
present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such 
alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) only through the enactment of a 
State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”).   
To “enact” means simply “to establish by legal and authoritative act” or to “make 
into law.”  See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 744 (1975) (second 
definition); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 75 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “enact” as “[t]o 
make into law by authoritative act”) (first definition).  While it is true that “enact” is 
often used in reference to legislation, it is also true that courts “enact” rules and decisions 
that have the force of law.5  This is true whether the verb “enact” or the noun 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In the decisions that 
followed, the courts enacted a judicially created immunity for private rehabilitation 
facilities and similar programs based on important public policy considerations (an 
exception to the exception, so to speak).”); Am. Milling Co. v. Brennan Marine, Inc., 623 
F.3d 1221, 1224 (8th Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
enacted rules to establish a uniform judicial procedure by which a vessel owner could 
seek to limit its liability under the Limitation Act. Over time, these rules were amended 
and relabeled, and Rule F was eventually adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”); Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 444 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Tennessee 
Supreme Court enacted TSCR 39 on June 2001 . . . .”); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 
1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court enacted Rule 23(f) specifically 
to permit such appeals, pursuant to an ‘express grant of authority by Congress to create 
appellate jurisdiction over non-final judgments.’”); Grady v. United States, 269 F.3d 913, 
917 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The Court enacted what is now codified as Supreme Court Rule 
29.2 . . . .”); Byrd v. Delo, 917 F.2d 1037, 1049 (8th Cir. 1990) (“As the Missouri courts 
enacted both Rule 27.26 and Rule 91, they should decide the proper relationship between 
4825-2491-7641 9 
 
“enactment” is used.6  Moreover, under the Utah Constitution, this Court is the only body 
authorized to enact laws determining who is admitted to the bar.  Thus, even if section 
1621 applied to the Utah Supreme Court and to the Utah State Bar (which it does not), 
this Court would be permitted to enact the “State law” necessary to permit undocumented 
immigrants to become members of the bar. 
III. A RESTRICTIVE READING OF SECTION 1621 WOULD RENDER 
IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
 
Interpreting section 1621 as applying to admission to the bar and limiting the opt-
out provision to legislative action would render it unconstitutional.  Such a statute would 
violate the principles of state sovereignty and state equality at the foundation of our 
federalist system of government.  This is a compelling reason not to interpret section 
1621 in that way.  See Due South, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Ctrl., 2008 UT 71, 
                                                          
these two rules.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1124 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (‘It is not surprising, therefore, that, when the Supreme Court enacted a set of 
copyright rules . . . it provided . . . that a writ for seizure of infringing articles should be 
directed to the marshal.”). 
6 See, e.g., Marlette v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 57 A.3d 1224, 1227 (Pa. 2012) 
(“Finally, the majority concluded its holding was supported by the policy considerations 
underlying this Court’s enactment of Rule 238, namely, to encourage settlements.”); T.C. 
v. Mac.M., 96 So.3d 115, 121 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (“The legislature is presumed to 
know of the supreme court’s enactment of Rule 28, Ala. R. Juv. P. . . .”); State v. Thomas, 
851 P.2d 673, 676 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (discussing “this court’s enactment of CrR 2.3 
in 1973”); Buskirk v. Suddath, 400 So.2d 810, 811 (Fla. 3d CDA 1981) (“No clear intent 
mandating retroactive application appears in the Florida Supreme Court’s enactment of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration.”); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[T]he decision in that case was rendered prior 
to the Supreme Court’s enactment in 1938 of the Federal Rules.”). 
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¶ 39, 197 P.3d 82 (“We will construe a statute as constitutional wherever possible, 
resolving any reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality.”); State v. Morrison, 2001 
UT 73, ¶ 12, 31 P.3d 547 (“[T]his court has a duty to construe a statute whenever 
possible so as to save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities.”) (internal quotation 
and alteration marks omitted). 
“By splitting the atom of sovereignty, the Founders established two orders of 
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it”—the state and 
the federal.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489, 504 n.17 (1999)) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted).  To preserve this 
balance of power, the federal government is prohibited by the United States Constitution 
from dictating “the internal policy of the state.”  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 
(1911).   Any reading of section 1621 that would allow states to grant bar licenses to 
undocumented immigrants by legislative processes but not through court rules would 
violate this fundamental proscription.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 (“When the Federal 
Government asserts authority over a State’s most fundamental political processes, it 
strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our liberty and republican 
form of government . . . . A state is entitled to order the processes of its own governance” 
by deciding what it “assign[s] to the political branches [or to] the courts . . . .”). 
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Not only would such a reading of section 1621 unconstitutionally infringe on the 
internal structure of governance of the states, it would also violate the equal sovereignty 
or “equality of states” principle.  See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  In 
Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Voting Rights Act that 
limited the ability of certain states to enact their own election laws on the basis that the 
statute unconstitutionally accorded some states more sovereignty than others.  Id. at 544.  
Any federal statute with a “disparate geographic coverage,” the Court explained, must 
discriminate in a way that “is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”  Id. at 
542 (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 
203 (2009)).   
If section 1621 prevented this Court from permitting undocumented immigrants to 
become members of the bar simply because Utah delegates the regulation of legal 
practitioners to the judiciary, as opposed to the legislature, the law would discriminate 
against some states but not others based solely on their internal structure of governance.  
There is no relation between the purposes of the statute and the internal delegation of 
state sovereignty that justifies such disparate treatment.7 
                                                          
7 Indeed, the stated purpose of section 1621 is “self-sufficiency” and to encourage “aliens 
within the Nation’s borders [to] rely on their own capabilities” to meet their needs.  8 
U.S.C. § 1601.  Admitting otherwise-qualified DACA recipients to practice law in Utah 
as members of the Utah State Bar does not undermine these policies; it fortifies them. 
4825-2491-7641 12 
 
IV. DACA RECIPIENTS ARE AS QUALIFIED FOR ADMISSION TO 
THE UTAH BAR AS ANY OTHER UTAHNS, AND JUSTICE 
REQUIRES ALLOWING THEIR ADMISSION. 
 
DACA recipients are Utahns.  They grew up here.  They are our friends, our 
neighbors, our colleagues, and our coworkers.  The only difference between DACA 
recipients and other bar applicants is immigration status.  But that is not a good reason to 
deny them admission because DACA recipients are not responsible for their immigration 
status.  They were brought to the United States as minors.  Penalizing DACA recipients 
for this history punishes them for the acts of their parents, which is fundamentally unjust 
and contrary to Utah values.  
In fact, being a DACA recipient is evidence in favor of character and fitness to 
practice law.  Individuals may only request DACA status if they have not been convicted 
of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and do not 
otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety.8  
Denying DACA recipients admission to the Utah Bar hurts the legal community.  
Pushing DACA recipients to live and practice law in other states removes highly-
qualified, hard-working lawyers from Utah so that they can serve the legal needs of 
                                                          
8 To the extent there is any concern about character and fitness of particular DACA 
recipients, that issue is better addressed through the ordinary character and fitness review, 
not through a blanket prohibition.  
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clients in other states.  Not only does this harm clients in Utah, it slows the development 
of the law by depriving the state of excellent advocates.9  
CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons set forth above, section 1621 does not, and indeed could not, 
prohibit this Court from allowing otherwise qualified DACA recipients to be admitted to 
practice law in Utah.  Accordingly, and given the strong policy interests favoring such a 
rule, we respectfully request that the Petition be granted. 
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of March 2019. 
       
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
 
 
 /s/ Stephen E. W. Hale    
Stephen E. W. Hale 
David C. Reymann 
Stephen C. Mouritsen 
LaShel Shaw 
Jason R. Perry 
 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae  
Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. 
 
  
                                                          
9 Narrowing the Utah legal community also drives up legal rates and decreases Utahns’ 
access to affordable legal counsel, an area of increasing concern.  See Chief Justice 
Matthew Durrant, 2019 State of the Judiciary at 5–6 (Jan. 28, 2019) (“[O]ne area in 
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